Important Notes
- A nuclear-weapons-based anti-satellite system is likely being developed by Russia, but it has not yet been fully implemented, which would be a treaty violation.
- Widespread military and commercial systems in low- and medium-earth orbit would be in danger of being destroyed by this system, which would also complicate strategic deterrence and cause ground effects.
- To warn the general public about the effects on economic and geopolitical stability, the USG is slightly opening the curtain on the growing weaponization of space.
- Assessments of space-based threats ( both human and natural ) should be incorporated into the core capabilities that businesses rely on to run their operations, particularly satellite communications, position-navigation/timing, and ground-Based systems that depend on space.
Recommendations
To increase enterprise resilience, organizations that have up until this point relied on the dependability and accessibility of space systems should carry out scenario-based planning and exercises.
Executives ought to inquire:
- If local electrical infrastructure, GPS, or satellite communications were to be downgraded or interrupted for weeks or months, how would my business survive?
- What collateral effects might an overt militarization of space or a direct space conflict have on terrestrial geopolitical and economic affairs?
- How can we make an effort to better understand and evaluate how these government activities—which are typically highly classified and shrouded in secrecy—will affect my commercial goals?
- How can we as a company increase the redundancy and resilience of our PNT and essential communications service providers?
What took place?
According to numerous sources, Russia is currently working on a space-based anti-satellite ( ASAT ) nuclear weapons system that, if put into use, would be strategically destabilizing. Russia “does not appear close to deploying” a nuclear weapon itself, according to sources, and it is not regarded as an “urgent threat.” A “limited window of time, which they did not define, to prevent its deployment,” however, exists.
The Washington Post‘s reporting aligned with the NYT, quoting officials who were aware that the capability involved “damaging critical intelligence or communications satellites with a nuclear weapon,” even though NPR sources were unsure whether it was based on nuclear weapons or simply nuclear powered.
What Makes It Important?
Such a system’s goal is to use electromagnetic interference and radiation effects on orbiting satellites to produce some sort of “area-denial.” The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which was negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union, forbids the use of nuclear weapons in space.
This information is relevant to Russia’s well-known substantial superoruzhie (” superweapons” ) investments as an asymmetrical counterbalance to American technical dominance. This new nuclear ASAT system continues the trend of creating weapons that strike fear of catastrophic destruction in order to maintain a strategic balance, from the Status-6 megaton nuclear torpedo to the M730 Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, and 9M7300 Bur-built Cruise missile.
These reports are noteworthy because they were released shortly after Kosmos-2575, a payload related to national security, was launched by the Russians on 09FEB24 and coincided with its launch on 27DEC23. These satellites ‘ orbital parameters are identical, according to the US Space Force. These launches resemble those Russia carried out in 2022 with “inspector satellites” that can travel through space and “exhibited characteristics of a space weapon” but are n’t purportedly nuclear in nature.
What Is AmericaSaying?
The Deputy Secretary of Defense wrote to X on 13 January 24 and said,” The United States is committed to leading with restraint and responsibility in the space domain—and in every domain.” We take action to prevent escalation. We make an effort to avoid misunderstanding. And we collaborate with like-minded countries to maintain peace in the space domain.
The following day, on January 14, Hicks, the deputy secretary of defense, stated that space could either be a place of stability, tranquility, or possibility or one of unpredictability, chaos, and destruction. The United States categorically favors the latter for the benefit of all people, and we fervently urge all other countries to follow suit. In retrospect, this appears to be a blatant criticism of the Russians ‘ covert efforts to weaponize and destabilize the space domain.
The DoD’s classification policy for space was recently revised by Hicks in an order to release information that had previously been kept in Special Access Programs for wider distribution to allies and partners. The National Security Space Association was informed by General Hynten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2021 that “deterrence does not happen in the classified world.” In contrast to the black, the white experience deterrence.
According to The Washington Examiner,” Russian physicists have openly theorized plans to create a plasma wave that strikes targets in space at range” by vaporizing another target-facing element.
Background in Technology
The U.S. must now decide how to respond and how much of that response must be made public in light of this disclosure. The Senate and the White House are currently debating how to respond while maintaining geopolitical and strategic flexibility as a result of Rep. Turner’s statement and presentation of pertinent intelligence to the entire House.
According to a report from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,” all LEO]low earth orbit ] satellites that are n’t specifically hardened to resist radiation generated by that explosion could be rendered inoperable in weeks to months by one low-yield ( 10-20 kt ) high altitude ( 125-300 km ) nuclear explosion.” They point out that such an attack’s strategic goal would be to “deliberately cause economic damage with lower likelihood of nuclear retaliation “—by a rogue state facing economic strangulation, an impending military defeat, or another economic threat to the industrial world without causing human casualties or obvious infrastructure damage.
High altitude electromagnetic pulse ( HEMP ) would have immediate, though somewhat localized, effects on the ground and air infrastructure. However, the majority of orbital telecommunications assets would be disrupted globally within a few weeks due to the accumulating degradation against LEO assets.
The Pentagon also emphasized that” the PRC is developing other sophisticated space-based capabilities, such as satellite inspection and repair” in its yearly report on the military of the People’s Republic of China. These abilities could at least be used as a weapon.
Crisis management, strategic signaling, and deterrence options are available because, as of right now, it appears that Russia has not yet put nuclear weapons into orbit. The U.S. would, however, be in the midst of an immediate strategic crisis comparable to the Cuban Missile Crisis, at a time when leaders are preoccupied with global crises and geopolitical flashpoints, if they were to attempt to launch or actually launch an OST nuclear “package” into space.
What Information Should Executives Have?
The implications for terrestrial communications systems, the developing space economy, and world peace are extremely worrying, even though this is currently only in the strategic and orbital sphere. Additionally, Russia’s action is intended to act as a cross-domain deterrent to influence local conflicts and diplomacy, reflecting the dynamics of the Ukrainian War and its implied threat to cause chaos in space.
The fragility of global communications, position, navigation, and timing ( PNT ) systems to disruption or destruction in space is a problem that members of the intelligence and defense communities have long been worried about.
A growing and complex risk environment is being created by space weather, solar flares, proliferating directed energy, electromagnetic warfare systems ( both ground and space-based ), cyberattacks on space systems, and the worrying possibility of orbital nuclearization.